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Introduction
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution”[1] and this is no less true for viral pathogens 
than it is for their host species. To appreciate the full 
extent of the challenges posed by current and future 
emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), I believe it is 
insightful to take a coevolutionary perspective. 
Coevolution comprises the reciprocal, adaptive genetic 
changes that occur when two species interact. During 
coevolution, the direction and intensity of natural selec-
tion is constantly changing because adaptations in one 
species provoke counter-adaptations in the coevolving 
species. Despite continuous adaptations, none of the 
interacting species gain a sustained fitness advance, 
making antagonistic coevolution a zero-sum game [2– 
4]. This is also why coevolution has been likened to the 
character of the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s “Through 
the Looking Glass”, who said: “ . . . it takes all the 
running you can do, to keep in the same place”. But 
what would happen if one of the parties (our livestock 
and crops) lacked the coevolutionary means to run, 
whilst the other party (their parasites) had just received 
a significant fitness performance-enhancing boost? 
Here, I will discuss how recent changes in interactions 
between the evolutionary forces have fundamentally 
altered the Red Queen dynamics between parasites 
and their hosts. I believe we have created the perfect 
coevolutionary storm, and the question is: what can we 
do about it now?
Evolutionary forces
There are five evolutionary forces; three that create 
genetic variation (mutation, recombination and gene 
flow), one that changes the distribution of genetic var-
iation randomly (genetic drift), and one force that 
molds the genetic variation (selection).
Mutation
Ultimately, the origin of all genetic variation stems 
from mutations[5]. The pathogens with the highest 
mutation rate are the RNA viruses (Figure 1a). 
Although this group represents less than 25% of the 
pathogens that account for EIDs, they are responsible 
for the most devastating outbreaks in the past decades: 
HIV, influenza H1N1 and H5H1, severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus, Lassa virus, Ebola virus, 
the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, 
and SARS-CoV-2 [6–8]. The diversity generated by 
mutation helps in the evasion of host responses, and 
these so-called “mutant clouds” also enable RNA 
viruses to replicate in multiple host species[9]. Given 
their high mutation rate[10], rapid rate of replication, 
and vast population size [11] (Figure 1b), RNA viruses 
were the first out of the evolutionary starting blocks, 
able to take best advantage of the new opportunities in 
our rapidly changing world. With the vast population 
of well-interconnected human hosts and livestock 
(Figure 1c), the size of the gene pool of many zoonotic 
pathogens has significantly increased, thereby augment-
ing their evolutionary potential (cf. Fundamental 
Theorem of Natural Selection [12]). Indeed, zoonotic 
virus richness in domesticated mammalian species is 
highly correlated with the global abundance of humans 
and domesticated species[13]. The high mutation rate 
and abundance of virions makes the development of 
durable treatments more challenging[9]. This has 
implications also for the current COVID-19 pandemic, 
which in all likelihood will require annual booster 
vaccinations against SARS-CoV-2 to ensure vaccine 
efficiency and avoid the outbreak of new variants in 
the future. A vaccination program will work most 
effectively when hand in glove with public health sur-
veillance and contact tracing, to identify people who 
have been in close contact those infected with variants 
of concern to minimize their spread.
Recombination
By mixing the already available genetic variation into 
new combinations, recombination can also generate 
evolutionary novelty. Unlike mutation, recombination 
is not a strictly blind process, given that the segregating 
variation has already been “tried and tested” by natural 
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selection in another genomic background. 
Furthermore, recombination acts fast and it can have 
profound effects by swapping multiple nucleotides in 
a single event. In sexually reproducing organisms, 
meiotic recombination mixes the genetic contributions 
from both parents in the offspring, which is the prin-
ciple evolutionary advantage of sex[14]. Although many 
pathogens reproduce asexually, some can still recom-
bine their genome by template switching[15], i.e. the 
exchange between closely related (homologous) genes 
from other viruses. Several studies have documented 
evidence of genetic recombination in coronaviruses, 
both in animals, such as MHV, TGEV, and feline and 
canine coronaviruses, as well as in human-infecting 
coronaviruses, including MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-1 
(reviewed in Su et al [6].), and SARS-CoV-2[8]. 
Recombination can rapidly increase the level of varia-
tion, but its potential to generate evolutionary novelty 
is considerably enhanced when combined with another 
evolutionary force – gene flow.
Gene flow
This evolutionary force is perhaps most under our 
control, as it involves the physical movement of plants, 
animals, humans, and their associated pathogens. Such 
migration results in gene flow when it leads to genetic 
exchange between otherwise isolated gene pools. 
However, moderating gene flow has significant social- 











































Figure 1. Coevolutionary disequilibrium between livestock, humans and pathogens. (a) Viruses have an extremely high mutation 
rate.[10], and (b) a high abundance[11]. In combination with their rapid rate of replication, these properties give viruses a high 
evolutionary potential. (c) The biomass of livestock is over an order of magnitude higher than that of all wildlife combined[11], yet 
their genetic effective size [30] is 80 times lower than the minimum viable population size of free-living species[31], which makes 
livestock vulnerable to infectious disease. (d) Habitat destruction, illegal wildlife trade and human activities have increased gene flow 
and brought many species into contact, which is facilitating spillover and hybridization of pathogens[16]. (e) The highly abundant 
and genetically depleted livestock act as “mixing vessels” where different pathogens can hybridize[7]. (f) Close contact between 
livestock and humans can lead to spillovers, which make zoonotic hybrid pathogens a significant threat to human health now and in 
the future[40].
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trade-off the benefits of economic growth, and people’s 
well-being and education, against the costs to human 
health and the environment. In addition, climate 
change can further elevate the rate of gene flow of the 
pathogens associated with humans, livestock and wild-
life. Gene flow of pathogens can also be mediated by 
natural vectors, and it can be an indirect result of 
habitat destruction, environmental change, illegal wild-
life trade, and other human activities [16,17]. Migration 
and the gene flow of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID- 
19 pandemic need to be minimized, which requires 
difficult political decisions and broad public support 
for a vaccine passport (or “immunity passport”, 
“immunity-based license”), such as the UK’s “COVID 
status certification” and the EU’s “Digital Green 
Certificate”. Vaccine passports provide proof that 
a person has been vaccinated against COVID-19, 
received a negative test result, or recently recovered 
from COVID-19, and they offer three important bene-
fits: (1) helping to open up the economy and society 
more rapidly; (2) protecting lives by reducing the risk 
of people contracting the virus; and (3) shortening the 
transmission chains, thereby reducing the opportunity 
for the virus to evolve increased virulence. 
Implementation of such vaccine passports will have 
significant implications across a wide range of legal 
and ethical issues affecting individuals and societies 
globally (see below).
Genetic introgression
When gene flow brings two previously isolated popula-
tions into contact so that they can hybridize and 
recombine their genomes, this may result in genetic 
introgression. Genetic introgression can release vast 
levels of evolutionary novelty, and it is thought to 
have been responsible for one of the largest known 
speciation events of vertebrates; the radiation of cichlid 
fishes in the Great African Lakes [18]. Introgression 
between diverged lineages has also led to the evolution 
of human-specialized pathogens[19]. The potential for 
hybridization between previously isolated species is at 
a record high (Figure 1), and pathogens are exception-
ally well poised to exploit the new opportunities offered 
by genetic exchanges[20]. The genetic introgression 
that results from hybridization can produce mosaic- 
like genomes[21], and these novel combinations of 
genes occasionally enable the hybrids to infect new 
host species[22], or increase virulence[23]. According 
to the “mixing vessel” theory[24], some species of 
domesticated animals provide potential contact zones 
for multiple pathogens to exchange their genes (Figure 
1). Pigs, for example, are susceptible to both avian and 
human influenza viruses, and these multiple infections 
can result in the evolution of novel hybrid strains such 
as H2N3[24]. Given the zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV 
-2, and the close contact between its most common 
host (humans) and domesticated animals, the vaccina-
tion of some domesticated species may be required in 
the future[25].
Selection
Natural selection molds the genetic variation intro-
duced by mutation, recombination, and gene flow, 
resulting in adaptive evolution and increased fitness. 
Due to their rapid rate of replication and vast popula-
tion size, pathogens are able to evolve rapidly, adap-
tively responding to changes in their environment. The 
discipline of evolutionary epidemiology studies how 
ecology, human behavior, and (medical) interventions 
shape the evolution of virulence in pathogens[26]. 
Although we are still unable to predict the exact trajec-
tory of virulence evolution, we do know that adaptive 
evolutionary changes in pathogens increase their 
momentary fitness. This means that decisions made 
presently on how to deal with COVID-19 globally are 
likely to have long-term consequences for the virulence 
evolution of this pathogen. As vaccination programmes 
are being executed globally, we will have to assess and 
minimize the risks posed by SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs in 
parts of the human population that cannot, or do not 
wish to, be vaccinated. Furthermore, we need to be 
aware of other reservoir host species and their spillback 
potential, which could lead to the reemergence of (loca-
lized) COVID-19 outbreaks in the future. Hence, the 
continued monitoring of the disease, the global rollout 
of vaccines, vaccination of susceptible host species, and 
vaccine passports are measures that will need to be 
employed to successfully combat this disease.
The Red Queen in a globalized world
So, how did we get here? To better understand what has 
shifted the status quo between (human) hosts and our 
zoonotic pathogens, it is useful to examine the theory 
of coevolution, and in particular the Red Queen’s 
hypothesis. This hypothesis was originally proposed to 
explain the constant rate of extinction specific to 
a given group of species[2]. According to this hypoth-
esis, the amount of resources controlled by a species 
determines its fitness, and hence, its population size. 
Furthermore, the amount of resources that one species 
gains results in an equivalent loss in its competing 
species, which could result in their extinction[3]. If we 
are to relate this evolutionary law to humans, we should 
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acknowledge that our fitness gain has not been accom-
plished by evolving superior physical traits to control 
more resources, but rather, by adapting our environ-
ment. Many people have access to near limitless 
amounts of animal protein and carbohydrates produced 
in agriculture by our livestock and crops. However, the 
production of these resources has been driven by eco-
nomic forces rather than evolutionary forces, and 
I believe this has tipped the coevolutionary balance in 
favor of our pathogens.
In the textbook example of coevolution, the frequen-
cies of two antagonistic species fluctuate over time. 
Parasites tend to disproportionately infect the most 
common host genotype, whilst the rare genotypes 
escape becoming parasitized. The rare genotypes can 
thereby increase in frequency until one of them 
becomes the most common genotype. In turn, this 
eases the selection pressure against the once-common 
genotype, saving it from being pushed to extinction. In 
this sense, “a genotype is its own worst enemy, its fitness 
will decrease as it becomes more common”[27]. This 
process leads to Red Queen dynamics, and it results 
in a large amount of genetic variation that can be 
maintained over long periods of time[4]. This genetic 
variation is important because it allows recombination 
to generate novel genotypes. Recombination might be 
the most important evolutionary advantage of sexual 
reproduction [14,28], shuffling the genetic variation of 
the parents into new offspring genotypes, enabling 
slowly evolving hosts to coexist with much faster evol-
ving parasites. Importantly, however, recombination 
can only generate novel variation when the parents 
possess genetic differences.
Adaptations in the host and parasite can also pro-
ceed in a “tit-for-tat” mode of coevolution, whereby 
both parties are under selection to “exceed” the antag-
onistic trait of the other species. This second type of 
coevolution is the other face of the Red Queen[4], and 
it is commonly known as the coevolutionary arms race. 
In this case, the antagonistic coevolution plays out 
between the virulence genes of the parasite and the 
immune genes (or resistance genes) of the host, and 
such coevolution is typified by a series of recurrent 
selective sweeps [4]. The host and parasite genotypes 
are rapidly replacing each other, and this process can 
drive one of the species to extinction[29]. In an arms 
race scenario, there are no second prizes; once the 
resistance of a gene or genotype has been broken, it 
can only be mend by evolving yet another resistant 
variant. The same rationale holds true for vaccines; 
once a pathogen like SARS-CoV-2 has evolved resis-
tance to the vaccine, new vaccines need to be developed 
and applied to continue protecting the population. This 
need for variation is fundamental to both Red Queen 
processes. However, in the first process (Red Queen 
dynamics), both the host and parasite have genetic 
variation “in credit”, whereas during an arms race 
scenario, new variation (or vaccines) need to be con-
stantly generated as the system is “in debit”.
Due to centuries of selective breeding, many of our 
livestock have become severely inbred; for example, the 
genetic variation present in 150 breeds of sheep and 
cattle is equivalent to a gene pool with a median effec-
tive population size of 52 individuals [30] (Figure 1c). 
This is 80 times lower than the minimum viable popu-
lation size calculated for the 212 free-living species 
reviewed by Traill et al [31]. With little genetic varia-
tion, this livestock lacks the “coevolutionary fuel” to 
adaptively respond to the challenges posed by new 
pathogens, forcing coevolution into an arms race sce-
nario. Consequently, our livestock is continually losing 
fitness with each novel pathogen it contracts. For our 
livestock – and perhaps also for us humans – the 
fitness ratchet clicks with every new EID that evolves 
and establishes itself. This is very pertinent to the 
original concept of the Red Queen hypothesis[2], 
which was originally formulated to understand the 
biotic conflicts over energy distribution among species. 
According to Van Valen: “ . . . an increase in momen-
tary fitness by one species causes an equal total decline 
in momentary fitness among ecologically interacting 
species”[3]. Given the extraordinarily high biomass of 
our livestock (and us humans), the momentary fitness 
gains that parasites could accomplish by exploiting this 
plentiful resource are truly astronomical. Parasites and 
pathogens will continue to adapt to exploit these 
resources, and it is high time we recognize this evolu-
tionary inevitability.
Pathogens have shaped societies over the past 
13,000 years, playing a major role in wars, the coloniza-
tion of continents, and the demise of civilizations[32]. 
True, infectious pathogens are not our only threat, but 
the risks and their impacts are closely interlinked with 
various other challenges [33,34]. In 2015, the UN set 
out 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets 
for 2030, which address economic, social and environ-
mental dimensions of sustainable development[35]. 
Two-thirds of these targets may not be reached as 
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic[36]. In particular, 
Goal 3 aims to ensure healthy lives and promote well- 
being, and Target 3.3 aims to end or combat many 
infectious diseases. Similarly, the Global Health 
Security Agenda vision statement reads: “A world safe 
and secure from global health threats posed by infectious 
diseases, whether natural, deliberate, or accidental”[37]. 
These visions, goals, and targets are ambitious and 
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transformational, but they do not recognize the danger 
posed by the evolution of novel zoonotic EIDs, and 
they do not prepare the public for the concessions we 
all will need to make as individuals to safeguard the 
future well-being of our species.
Toward a coevolutionary sustainable world
Control and reduce gene flow
To reduce the risks of future outbreaks of novel patho-
gens, we must control the gene flow of pathogens. 
Firstly, we can dramatically reduce the gene flow of 
human pathogens by altering some of our behaviors. 
Social distancing has already altered how we work and 
interact, which has markedly increased the uptake of 
online communication, such as Skype, Zoom, and 
FaceTime. Synchronous virtual communication plat-
forms are giving us a unique advantage over other 
social animals that are threatened by EIDs. [38] 
COVID-19 is likely to accelerate the development of 
virtual communication, and such technologies will not 
only be key to reducing the impact of EIDs, but they 
may also be part of the solution to other environmental 
challenges. In addition, the introduction of “vaccine 
passports” could be instrumental in facilitating safe, 
free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
enabling resumption of many social and economic 
activities. This will help to break transmission chains, 
which is not only important to prevent deaths now, but 
also halt the evolution of SARS-CoV-2 and to save lives 
in the future. There is significant political and public 
resistance against such passports, as some fear that 
these could be used discriminate against those refusing 
a COVID-19 vaccine, thereby applying pressure to raise 
vaccination rates. Some of the already most disadvan-
taged and discriminated against minorities have the 
lowest uptake rate of COVID-19 vaccine[39], putting 
these communities at increased risk, and potentially 
exacerbating inequalities. If we accept to need for 
a high level of vaccination to ameliorate potential 
inequalities arising from noncompliance, it may be 
necessary to consider compelling the uptake of vac-
cines. Sadly, this might be the price we have to pay 
for trailing in the Red Queen arms race. Similar to the 
momentary fitness loss of species at the receiving end 
of a coevolutionary arms race[3], we may have to 
accept the need for such measures until we have man-
aged to reset the coevolutionary imbalance. 
Importantly, implementing these urgent changes 
requires us to carefully negotiate a wide range of legal 
and ethical issues that could inadvertently discriminate 
or exacerbate existing inequalities. How best to adjust 
to this new status quo is being considered in various 
reports and committees, including the United Nations, 
UNESCO, EQUINET (the European Network of 
Equality Bodies), ENNHRI (the European Network of 
National Human Rights Institutions), the SET-C 
(Science in Emergencies Tasking – COVID-19) and 
many others.
Secondly, we have to better understand our enemy. 
Brooks et al. spelled it out in an acronym, DAMA – 
Document, Assess, Monitor, Act[40]. Zoonotic EIDs 
pose the most significant threat to our society, but the 
pandemic potential differs markedly between patho-
gens[7]. We need to dedicate more resources to 
sequencing the virome of wildlife and our livestock, 
enabling us to better track gene flow, and assess spil-
lover events and hybridization. Various programmes 
are already in place. For example, the Global Virome 
Project [41] conducts viral discovery and provide 
timely data for public health interventions against 
future pandemics. An estimated 1.67 million viral spe-
cies have yet to be discovered from mammal and bird 
hosts, and the costs of sequencing viruses with the 
highest zoonotic potential may be great (~1.2 to 
7 billion US dollars)[41], but they are dwarfed by the 
cost of another pandemic. The PREventing ZOonotic 
Disease Emergence (PREZODE) [42] is a particularly 
promising initiative that was announced recently at the 
One Planet Summit in January 2021. It aims to bring 
together the scientific and medical communities, pro-
moting an internationally coordinated strategy to 
tackle emerging risks, focussing on prevention and 
sustainable solutions, as well as preparedness for the 
outbreak of EIDs.
Thirdly, we will need to better assess the EID risks 
posed by other host species. Hosts vary in their suit-
ability as “mixing vessels and their ability to spread and 
transmit zoonotic pathogens to humans”[7]. Although 
we have known this for over a century[26], we have 
failed to act[39]. We now have the tools to identify 
hosts that pose the greatest zoonotic threat. For exam-
ple, Sun et al [43]. examined whether SARS-CoV-2 
could infect other species and found that one of the 
receptors in human ACE2 is identical to that of the 
receptor in macaques and chimpanzees. Such compara-
tive genomics could help to assess the host-specific 
risks of spillovers and spillbacks, enabling us to identify 
potential reservoir host species.
Fourthly, to minimize highest-risk gene flow, we will 
need to bring a halt to the loss of natural habitats in 
biodiversity hotspots, thereby reducing human-wildlife 
conflict and spillover events[17]. These actions will 
complement the SDG targets, of which 30 (18%) are 
predicted to help reduce the risk of another global 
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pandemic[36]. In this coevolutionary One Health 
approach, the protection of natural habitats and the 
environment is not just for the conservation of biodi-
versity, but also for the prevention of the next 
pandemic.
Restore genetic variation in livestock
In order to limit the reservoir of susceptible hosts, we 
will need to restore genetic diversity of farmed and 
domesticated animals (as well as crops), going 
beyond the goals and targets set out by the Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020[44], and the UN 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development [35]. Our 
livestock is at an overwhelming coevolutionary dis-
advantage, and it has become a “sitting duck” in the 
middle of a rapidly heating arms race with EIDs. 
However, the genetic variation that is lost in our 
livestock and crops is still largely present, in wild 
varieties and wild relatives, and dispersed among 
different breeds. Understandably, breeding pro-
grammes have been focussing on a few, highly pro-
ductive breeds to maximize yield. Unfortunately, 
however, this has resulted in the extinction of 3.5% 
and 10% of domesticated breeds of birds and mam-
mals, respectively[45]. In the first global assessment 
of biodiversity for food and agriculture, the FAO 
found that the genetic resources of many production 
systems are in serious decline[46]. The report also 
shows that biodiversity loss increases disease risk, but 
sadly, it fails to anticipate the extreme coevolutionary 
vulnerability of many production systems. Unless we 
act now, massive losses of crops and livestock are an 
evolutionary inevitability.
Interestingly, however, some wild vertebrate spe-
cies such as the mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias mar-
moratus) appear to have evolved a genomic 
architecture that enables them to survive without 
novel, recombinant genetic variation. This fish can 
reproduce through self-fertilization, resulting in 
genetically near-uniform individuals. Remarkably, to 
offset its coevolutionary disadvantage, it has dupli-
cated many of its MHC immune genes[47]. 
Emulating this genomic solution, transgenic, cisgenic 
and intragenic approaches, gene editing, site-specific 
mutagenesis (genome editing), and gene pyramiding 
are applied or considered for more durable resistance 
in crops [48–50]. However, without genetic variation 
between individuals, there can be no coevolutionary 
balance with pathogens. Frankel [51] already wrote 
this in his landmark paper: “Variation – the essence 
of life.”. We are now half a century later, and it is 
time we act.
Reduce consumption of animal protein
Mass food production has underpinned our “ecological 
success”, but it is entirely unsustainable based on envir-
onmental, ecological, and coevolutionary grounds. We 
urgently need to reduce our reliance on animal protein, 
in particular the consumption of other mammals. 
Emission of potent greenhouse gases by ruminant live-
stock is contributing significantly to anthropogenic 
“radiative forcing” and global warming[52]. The vast 
amount of antibiotics used to enhance growth and 
control infections has led to the emergence of new, 
more virulent, and more resistant microorganisms 
[53]. Given that mammals are phylogenetically closely 
related to humans, they also pose the most significant 
threat for the evolution and transmission of zoonotic 
EIDs. Producing animal protein from aquaculture and 
aquaponics has the potential to become an environ-
mentally and coevolutionary more sustainable way of 
feeding part of the world’s population[46]. In addition, 
we will also need to develop a larger variety of palatable 
non-meat-based alternatives, which will have direct and 
indirect health benefits[54]. Reducing the number of 
livestock is imperative for human health, as well as for 
the health of the planet. To implement this and other 
changes, we must embrace a coevolutionary robust One 
Health approach and focus on what really matters: One 
World – One Health.
Concluding remarks
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are possibly the 
greatest existential threat to humanity, but fortunately, 
we have never been in a stronger position to defend 
ourselves against these threats. COVID-19 has elicited 
a huge pan-global response among our medical and 
scientific communities, and as a species, we have 
shown remarkable behavioral plasticity to cope with 
the new conditions. Nevertheless, COVID-19 has 
revealed the tension between our rights as individuals 
and the well-being of society as a whole. However, 
tackling this pandemic requires us to act as an eusocial 
species rather than as selfish individuals. It calls for 
increased social responsibility, in particular in the 
uptake of the vaccine and adherence to rules designed 
to control the COVID-19 pandemic. Misinformation 
on the web and “playing politics” can significantly 
undermine the much-needed concerted response. 
Going forward, we need to recognize that our health, 
the environment, and our global economy are all clo-
sely interlinked, and that the world’s natural resources 
must be governed in a way that attains a coevolutionary 
balance. The “One World – One Health” concept was 
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created in 2004, inspired by the “One Medicine” 
approach [55] that integrates human and veterinary 
medicine to respond to zoonoses[56]. By considering 
the health of humans, wildlife and ecosystems, the 
holistic One Health approach has recruited multisector 
expertise in dealing with humanity’s greatest challenge. 
New initiatives are emerging that envision innovative 
prevention strategies, such as PREZODE[42]. 
I advocate that these initiatives also address the coevo-
lutionary imbalance, integrating this into the One 
Health framework. Importantly, all these changes 
require broad public support underpinned by an 
understanding of the significant threat our society is 
facing, and what we can do at an individual and societal 
level to improve our long-term (coevolutionary) pro-
spects as a species. I believe that this is essential because 
with increased globalization, we have created a perfect 
storm for the evolution and outbreak of EIDs. Rather 
than just combating the existing EIDs and minimizing 
their social-economic impacts, we must also curtail the 
evolution of novel EIDs, thereby reducing the risks of 
future outbreaks, and the possible transition from the 
“Anthropocene” into a “Pathocene”.
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